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FOREWORD
The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah has
generated a vast amount of academic and military
studies, including a number from the Strategic Studies
Institute. Specifically, authors have tried to identify
the new patterns of warfare through this conflict and
sometimes have even called it the first illustration of
“hybrid war.” This new monograph by Dr. Jean-Loup
Samaan does not look at the war itself but rather at its
aftermath, both in Israel and Lebanon. It starts from an
obvious paradox: Despite the regional turmoil and the
absence of a settlement between Israel and Hezbollah,
stability has prevailed since 2006. While over the same
time frame the Middle East has been experiencing one
of its most unpredictable periods in the last decades,
the border area between Israel and Lebanon has
remained quiet.
Dr. Samaan explains that this paradox can be understood through the use of deterrence theories. Because both sides understood that a next round would
be devastating and that each could not entirely eliminate the threat of retaliation in a first wave of deterrence, the solution has been to bargain deterrence,
meaning to deter the other party from attacking its
homeland by pledging a full-scale retaliation. To support his claim, Dr. Samaan relies extensively on several field trips in countries, during which he conducted
numerous interviews, examined official statements,
and gathered grey literature.
Dr. Samaan makes an important contribution to
both policy and academic debates over the logic of war
between Israel and Hezbollah. In that perspective, his
discussion paves the way to a new appraisal of deterrence applied to nonstate actors, as well of escalation
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dynamics in the Levant. For this reason, the Strategic
Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph on
the role of the U.S. Army and the manner in which it
can best serve the nation today and in the future.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
For 7 years now, the border area between Israel
and Lebanon has witnessed calm and stability. At first
sight, this has all the appearances of a paradox. The
2006 war between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and
the Lebanese organization, Hezbollah, was followed
neither by a peace agreement nor by a mere diplomatic process. Both sides prepared their forces to wage
the next war and additionally have been confronted
in past years to major changes in the distribution of
power in the Middle East in the midst of the so-called
“Arab Spring.”
Against all odds, the area comprising north Israel and south Lebanon remained very quiet these
last months. This monograph argues that the key to
understand this paradox is the game of deterrence
played by both Israel and Hezbollah. Specifically, an
informal deterrence dialogue has been developing between Israel and Hezbollah and that strategic stability
prevailed because of this indirect exchange.
Because both sides understood that a next round
would be devastating and that each could not entirely
eliminate the threat of retaliation in a first wave the
solution has been to bargain deterrence, meaning to
deter the other party from attacking its homeland by
pledging a full-scale retaliation.
But to say that stability has been preserved between
Israel and Hezbollah thanks to deterrence does not
mean that this is a perennial state. This monograph also
stresses the precariousness of such deterrence system.
The stand-off between Israel and Hezbollah reached
this level only through specific measures and conditions that can be reversed in the future. In particular,
exogenous factors such as the unraveling of the Syrian
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civil war or the developments of the Iranian nuclear
issue can jeopardize the equilibrium. Moreover, the
study of Lebanese politics emphasizes the uncertainties related to the logic of deterrence with a nonstate
actor like Hezbollah. This is why this analysis offers a
cautious look at deterrence theories in the Middle East
and reminds that such situations are neither naturally
engendered nor eternally established.

x

FROM WAR TO DETERRENCE?
ISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT SINCE 2006
INTRODUCTION
For 7 years, the border area between Israel and
Lebanon has witnessed calm and stability. At first
sight, this state of affairs has all the appearances of
a paradox. The 2006 war between the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese organization, Hezbollah, was followed neither by a peace agreement nor
by a mere diplomatic process. Since then, both sides
did not disarm but prepared their forces to wage the
next war. The IDF started the planning of a rapid high
intensity military campaign targeting South Lebanon
and strategic locations inside Beirut (namely its southern suburbs, Dahya Janoubia, controlled by Hezbollah).
Meanwhile, Hezbollah not only rearmed, but also increased the lethality of its weaponry. Hezbollah also
trained its militiamen in a fashion that approached the
quality of Special Forces training in neighboring Arab
states. In particular, its missile and rocket strike force
is now able to reach major urban areas in Israel.
In addition to this arms race, both parties faced
critical challenges that could have triggered a new confrontation. In the spring of 2008, Hezbollah prompted
an internal conflict in Lebanon with its Sunni competitors that put the country on the brink of a new civil
war. Only a few months later, Israel was challenged
by rocket salvos on its southern front and conducted
Operation CAST LEAD in the Gaza Strip with the
objective of destroying the military threat emanating
from Hamas and other Palestinian factions.
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But overall, Israel and Hezbollah recently have
been confronted with major changes to the distribution of power in the Middle East especially during
the so-called “Arab Spring.” In particular, the revolution in Egypt and the civil war in Syria have been real
game changers for both sides as they tested and are
still testing the endurance of their regional strategies
and their alliances.
Israel pessimistically has assessed the outcomes of
the Arab uprisings. A ruler such as Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, considered to be one of the moderate
Arabs in Jerusalem, was replaced by a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated government in Cairo. Initially marginal during the Arab revolutions, the Brotherhood,
as well as the salafists, now represent leading political
forces in the Middle East. In the mind of policymakers in Jerusalem, such a regional trend could potentially jeopardize the current status quo with Israel.1
From the Israeli perspective, the July 2013 military
coup in Cairo that toppled Mohammed Morsi only
stressed the volatility and instability of the security
environment.
With regards to Hezbollah, its two patron states,
Iran and Syria, are confronted with close and immediate challenges. As a result of its nuclear program,
Iran faces a wide set of international economic sanctions which cripples its economy. Rumors of an Israeli
preemptive attack on its nuclear plants regularly resurface and the Gulf monarchies openly aim at Tehran’s spheres of influence in the Middle East and the
Arabian Peninsula. In Syria, the March 2011 peaceful
revolution turned into an all-out war between the rebels and the forces of Bashar al-Assad who eventually
dragged Iran and Hezbollah into the fights.
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Against this backdrop, common sense would predict that it would take only a slight miscalculation to
see Israel and Hezbollah entering into a new conflict,
the same way they did in 2006. But this did not happen. Against all odds, the area comprising north Israel and south Lebanon remained very quiet these last
months. Hence the question driving this monograph:
How did this stability prevail, even though none of
the root causes of the conflict had been addressed?
Based on extensive research on the field, this
monograph argues that the key to understanding this
paradox is the game of deterrence played by both Israel and Hezbollah. Specifically, this analysis explores
the very idea that an informal deterrence dialogue
has been developing between Israel and Hezbollah
and that, in fact, strategic stability—according to Paul
Nitze’s definition of the terms2—prevailed because of
this indirect exchange.
In other words, the fact that for the last 7 years both
parties prepared themselves to inflict a heavy, if not a
fatal, blow to the other is the very reason why no new
war has so far erupted. Both sides understood that a
next round would be devastating and that each could
not entirely eliminate the threat of retaliation in a first
wave. Therefore, the solution has been to bargain deterrence, meaning to deter the other party from attacking its homeland by pledging a full-scale retaliation.
But to say that stability has been preserved between
Israel and Hezbollah thanks to deterrence does not
mean that this is a perennial state. Deterrence works
through the combination of factors that can easily be
altered, particularly in an evolving regional environment such as the Middle East. The deterrence balance
between Israel and Hezbollah as a provisional framework bounded by geographical and socio-political
parameters is posited here.
3

To support the core argument, this monograph is
divided into four sections. The first section lays out
the theoretical and historical foundations of a deterrence game between Israel and Hezbollah by assessing the role of this concept in their strategic cultures.
The second section describes the making of an Israeli
military posture vis-à-vis the Party of God in the aftermath of the 2006 war until today. The third section details the parallel developments inside Hezbollah following the so-called “divine victory” of 2006. Finally,
the fourth section puts into perspective the deterrence
equilibrium between Israel and Hezbollah in the context of current, and possibly future, Middle East crises
such as the Syrian civil war and the Iranian nuclear
conundrum.
FACTORING DETERRENCE IN THE
ISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH CONFRONTATION
Positing the existence of a deterrence system—either loosely or robustly framed—between Israel and
Hezbollah since 2006 introduces several assumptions
that need to be addressed as prerequisites. In particular, one needs to assess the validity of such concept
with regard to the strategic cultures of both Israel and
Hezbollah in order to avoid the pitfall of incepting inadequate Western notions.
In fact, a preliminary survey evidences the fact that
the word “deterrence” is frequently used both in Israeli military literature and Hezbollah’s written documents. For a country that repeatedly resorted to the use
of power in its confrontation with regional enemies,
Israel may look like an odd applicant for deterrence
theories. However, the concept is commonly used by
officers and defense intellectuals in interviews as well
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as in academic research and military doctrines.3 The
reference to the concept of “deterrence” has been salient in the discourse of the Israeli military since the
founding of the Jewish State. It can be traced back to
David Ben Gurion’s rationale for Israeli retaliation policies vis-à-vis the Arabs in the early years of the Israeli
state. “Unless we show the Arabs that there is a high
price to pay for murdering Jews, we won’t survive,”
said Ben Gurion in 1953.4 Ben Gurion’s statement was
the preliminary sketch of an Israeli approach of deterrence by punishment. Two years later, Moshe Dayan,
then Chief of staff of the IDF, explained similarly in a
speech that:
We cannot guard every water pipeline from explosion
and every tree from uprooting. We cannot prevent every murder of a worker in an orchard or a family in
their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on
our blood, a price too high for the Arab community,
the Arab army, or the Arab government to think it
worth paying.5

Both statements of Ben Gurion and Dayan reflect
the primary specificity of Israel’s approach to deterrence. Contrary to European and American approaches, deterrence in the Israeli strategic culture was never
conceived as disconnected from the conduct of military operations, it actually derives from their effectiveness. Whereas western deterrence thinkers distinguish
between deterrence posture and warfighting posture,
Israeli military planners do not delve into these theoretical discussions. In other words, retaliation against
an aggression or a preemptive attack does not mean
a failure of deterrence. Retaliation strikes are thought
as necessary measures to sustain, on the long haul, the
deterrence balance.
5

A recent illustration of this Israeli specificity is the
mainstream discourse within the IDF that followed
the 2012 Pillars of Defense operation in the Gaza Strip:
it was not portrayed as the result of a failed deterrence
system with Hamas and Palestinian factions but as a
necessary intervention to restore deterrence.6 In other
words, deterrence is not a pure endstate nor a mere
mental construct in Israel’s military mentality, it is a
cumulative process that includes sporadic clashes to
refresh the rules of the game.
This is why some Israeli scholars prefer talking
about “cumulative deterrence.” Doron Almog, Major General from the Israeli Reserve, explains in the
journal, Parameters:
Unlike classical deterrence as practiced during the
Cold War, and whose success hinged on a bipolar
standoff that held in check any impulse to launch a
nuclear first strike, cumulative deterrence is based on
the simultaneous use of threats and military force over
the course of an extended conflict.7

Later in his article, Almog argues against the proponents of classical deterrence thought that consider
the use of force as a deterrence failure:
Cumulative deterrence works on two levels. On the
macro level, it seeks to create an image of overwhelming military supremacy. On the micro level, it relies
on specific military responses to specific threats or
hostile acts. Cumulative deterrence has several key
features. First, its effectiveness is measured in terms
of the number of victories accumulated over the duration of the conflict, which we can think of as ‘assets
in a victory bank’. Second, over time these victories
produce increasingly moderate behavior on the part of
the adversary and a shift in his strategic, operational,
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and tactical goals until there is a near-absence of direct
conflict. Third, this moderation may eventually result
in political negotiations and perhaps even a peace
agreement.8

The very fact that Israeli decisionmakers do not
separate deterrence from the use of force may put into
question the relevance of the concept in the first place.
When interviewed for this monograph, retired officers
were keen on admitting that “Israel does not spend
the time Europeans or American spend on discussing
and elaborating their theory of deterrence, and to be
fair the people who use the word deterrence might not
know how to define it.”9 Professor Uri Bar-Joseph stated, “Israeli officers are sometimes confusing the idea
of deterrence with simple coercion.”10 Three decades
ago, Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen noted likewise
that “there has been little systematic, let alone theoretical, elaboration of the concept by Israeli decisionmakers.”11 This is sometimes explained by the fact that the
intellectual foundations of deterrence in Israel were
not laid by scholars and thinkers like in the West (by
figures such as Bernard Brodie and Herman Kahn in
the United States, or Raymond Aron in France) but by
practitioners (Ben Gurion and Dayan as well as Shimon Peres and Yigal Allon) who were less keen on
developing an in-depth analytical framework.12
This dimension of Israeli strategic thinking regarding deterrence leads to a first lesson. Even though deterrence is part, and has always been part, of Israeli
strategic culture, it does not fully match the acceptance
of the concept in Western military circles. The implications for the case are two-fold. First, as the next section
discusses, the Israeli approach of cumulative deterrence induces that the war of 2006 did not render the
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idea of deterrence vis-à-vis Hezbollah irrelevant, but
rather it sees the conflict as a necessary enterprise to
maintain status quo on the long-term, or to capitalize
“assets in a victory bank,” to use Almog’s expression.
Second, this also means that if deterrence is acknowledged in the Israeli military establishment, it does not
imply that the IDF excludes using force in the future
against the Party of God, nor would it imply that a
new clash would be tantamount to a failure to deter.
In the case of Hezbollah, references to deterrence
are rather more difficult to detect in speeches and official documents before 2006. In the first years following
the formation of the Party in 1982, the representatives
of the Party were using a rhetoric that could not include the idea of deterrence with Israel. Indeed, such
concept entails the recognition of the enemy and the
resolve to preserve existing status quo. In the 1980s,
the ideological platform of Hezbollah would not accommodate with these prerequisites as it was primarily driven by a revolutionary spirit. In the words of Hezbollah’s founders such as Abbas Mussawi, Israel was
depicted as a Zionist entity that had invaded Lebanon
and was occupying large parts of the Southern countryside. As a result, Hezbollah did not acknowledge
the very existence of Israel and its political rhetoric
was filled by messages of resistance and revolution.
It can be argued that until the mid-1990s, the strategic culture of Hezbollah remained one of a classic
militia that relied on suicide attacks against military
convoys as its primary tactics. The political thinking
within the Party of God in general, and vis-à-vis Israel
in particular, evolved dramatically in the aftermath of
Lebanon’s civil war. In 1992, the accession of Hassan
Nasrallah to the position of secretary general following
the assassination of Abbas Mussawi was the starting
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point of a process of Lebanonization that eventually
changed both political and military cultures of the organization. The political strategy of Hassan Nasrallah
is well known. As Hezbollah became a player in postcivil war Lebanon, the new secretary general balanced
revolutionary rhetoric with electoral pragmatism.13
The military views of Nasrallah are less documented. In response to Mussawi’s assassination on February 16, 1992, Hezbollah fired the first katyusha rockets
at Northern Israel. In the days that followed, Nasrallah delivered an interview to Lebanese newspaper,
As Safir, to discuss this new tactic. The interview can
be identified as a turning point in Hezbollah’s military strategy vis-à-vis Israel. True the revolutionary
message of the 1980s is still palpable:
The long-term strategy of the Islamic Resistance is
clear and does not require additional explanation. It
involves fighting against Israel and liberating Jerusalem . . . namely, ending Israel as a state.

But if Nasrallah qualifies this conflict with Israel
as an existential one, he also concedes later in the
interview:
We are not unrealistic. We do not pretend that our
military capabilities and the numbers of our mujahidin would be enough to regain Jerusalem. . . . We do,
however, believe that the resistance has to finish the
job it started.14

This conclusion of Nasrallah on the military imbalance between his movement and the IDF is a precious one as it paved the way to its strategy for the
last 2 decades:
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We have to work instead toward creating a situation in which the enemy is subject to our conditions.
We should tell him: ‘If you attack us, we will use our
katyushas; if you do not attack us, we will not use our
katyushas’.15

This idea of using rockets as means of coercion was
to be put into practice during the clashes of following years, from the April War of 1996 to the July War
of 2007.
If these elements constitute the foundations of a
potential deterrence strategy of Hezbollah, this latter grew in earnest only after the IDF withdrawal of
South Lebanon in 2000. At first, Hezbollah refused to
recognize the new border circumscribed by the United Nations (UN) as the so-called “blue line” in Resolution 425. But 2 years later, Nasrallah announced
that the organization would respect the demarcation.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah made claims concerning the
occupied territories of the Shebaa Farms, and only engaged in low-intensity operations against Israel. This
led Israeli thinkers to consider that Hezbollah may accept certain rules of the games. In 2004, Daniel Sobelman was optimistically evaluating for the Tel Avivbased Jaffee Center that “the creation of ‘rules of the
game’ increases the chances that relative quiet will be
preserved for a longer period.”16
One could argue that after 2000, apart from the
Shebaa theater, Hezbollah became a status quo force.
Only since then, has the rhetoric of deterrence progressively entered into the discourse of Hezbollah’s
militants and strategists. Today, the shelves of the
bookstores in the Dahya Janoubia of Beirut are filled
with hagiographic books about the movement that detail the military thinking of the Party. This literature,
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which proliferated after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal,
typically looks like propaganda documents masked
into phony academic studies. But beyond the bravado
that may annoy readers not acquainted with Hezbollah’s rhetoric, these documents sometimes contain elements that altogether constitute a coherent body of
strategic thought. Hezbollah has indeed produced a
vast amount of strategic thinking since the end of the
Israeli occupation, either on the strategic values of its
missiles or on the practice of psychological warfare.17
For instance, in his study on Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy, Lebanese political writer Youssef
Nasrallah uses a famous quote from Hassan Nasrallah, who back in 2000 portrayed Israel as “a spider’s
web” due to its aversion for protracted conflict and
explains how this metaphor captures the whole strategy of Hezbollah.18 There is explicit linkage in the Hezbollah literature between this idea of Israel being a
spider’s web and its rocket strategy. Specifically the
arsenal plays a role which transcends mere warfighting purpose; it is part of a mental bargain with Israel.
In other words, it is a tool of deterrence.
As we will see in the next two sections, these developments on both sides about deterrence did not
stop after 2006, they actually grew more sophisticated.
THE REMAKING OF ISRAELI MILITARY
POSTURE VIS-À-VIS HEZBOLLAH
On the morning of August 14, 2006, a UN-brokered
ceasefire put an end to the 33-day war between Israel
and Hezbollah. For the first time in its history, Israel
ended a conflict without a decisive military result.19
Following this setback, political and military authorities were confronted with severe criticism, and sev-
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eral investigations were launched to understand the
causes of Israel’s inability to address the challenge
posed by Hezbollah.
The blame was diverse. Some observers were puzzled by the lack of detailed knowledge of intelligence
agencies on Hezbollah’s military power.20 In particular, Hezbollah’s use of Chinese-made, Iranian-upgraded C-802 radar-guided missiles against an Israeli
missile boat patrolling off the Lebanese coast took the
planners in Tel Aviv by surprise. Others wondered
about the level of military readiness within the IDF
to conduct a conventional conflict. But eventually the
biggest amount of blame was directed at the supreme
command, specifically the failed leadership of both
the prime minister and minister of defense in times
of crisis.
The first consequence came on August 17 when
Minister of Defense Amir Peretz established a military
review committee to be led by former Chief of Staff
Amnon Lipkin Shahak. But only 5 days after its creation, Peretz’s committee was dissolved due to a massive opposition from both the media and the military.
After several other similar attempts in the following weeks, Ehud Olmert decided to appoint a governmental committee of inquiry, which would be responsible for independent investigation on the political
and military conduct of the July war. The head of the
committee was retired judge Dr. Eliyahu Winograd.
The year was one of critical changes for the Israeli
defense apparatus. Political and military leaders in
charge during the July war slowly stepped aside. In
January, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dan Halutz
resigned to be replaced by Lieutenant General Gabi
Ashkenazi. Later that year, after having lost a vote
within the Labor Party, Amir Peretz left the office of
defense minister to the new Labor Party, Ehud Barak.
12

In April, the Winograd committee issued its first
interim report, which that confirmed numerous deficiencies in the decisionmaking process. The report
argued that Ehud Olmert’s decision was not based on
“a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military
plan, nor based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena.”21 According to the
committee, the period following the IDF’s withdrawal
from Lebanon in 2000 was characterized as “the era
of containment.”22 During that period, Israel restricted
its responses to limited strikes on Hezbollah targets
and reconnaissance flights over Lebanon. The idea
of a fallacious containment approach grew popular
among the IDF officers, and pointed to the seemingly
lack of Israeli firmness vis-à-vis Hezbollah prior to the
2006 war.23
On the question of military readiness, the interim
report explained that after the Intifada decade of urban policing mission in Palestinian territories, the IDF
was barely prepared to engage in a high-intensity operation that combined airpower and ground forces.
For the Winograd Commission, the military leaders:
did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between [their] own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand—as
was necessary under [their] own plans—early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and
trained in case a ground operation would be required.
. . . Even after these facts became known to the political
leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground.24

A month later, the findings of the Winograd report
were complemented by the conclusions of the Brodet
Commission, a commission mandated to examine the
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Israeli defense budget. In its final report, the Brodet
Commission argued that a mix of stagnant defense
spending, intelligence failures, and ill-suited doctrine
and training programs led the IDF to the failure of the
Summer 2006 war.
But while the media focused during that period on
the mistakes made by the highest echelons of the political-military chain of command, another debate was
ensuing among officers and defense thinkers on the
evolution of Israeli military thinking and how this was
reflected in the pitfalls of 2006. In the aftermath of the
war with Hezbollah, a convenient target was the IDF’s
Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI) led by
Brigadier General Shimon Naveh since its creation in
1995. Dismantled shortly after the war—although the
decision had been taken earlier—OTRI became the
catalyst of critics of the IDF. An iconoclast inside the
military establishment, Naveh had developed a vast
project of intellectual transformation within Israel’s
military establishment that borrowed from postmodern French philosophy, literary theory, architecture
and psychology.25 Some interviewees described the
seminars conducted by Naveh as grotesque postgraduate workshops during which philosophers Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guttari were more often quoted
than classic military thinkers.26 Avi Kober reports that
during these meetings:
Naveh was using a diagram resembling a ‘square
of opposition’ that plotted a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labeled with phrases
such as ‘Difference and Repetition—The Dialectics
of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Maneuver’, ‘Velocity vs. Rhythms’, ‘The
Wahabi War Machine’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists’ and
‘Nomadic Terrorists’.27
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Three months prior to the 2006 war, a new concept
of operations had been issued by OTRI and addressed
to the General Staff. According to several insiders, this
new concept, titled “General Staff’s Operational Art
for the IDF,” had not undergone proper assimilation
processes before its official approval.28 Its content reflected the heavy influence of American military ideas,
and in particular the now-gone concept of effectsbased operations which was, back in 2006, a dominant approach inside the IDF, and in particular inside
OTRI.29 In retrospect, military planners denigrated the
document. For instance, Major General Gadi Eisenkot,
while working in the Joint Staff during the 2006 War,
stated that the “manual was a hostile virus in the guise
of an operational concept that had infiltrated the military system and made a shambles of it.”30 The numerous attacks against OTRI are not all well founded, in
particular the one that links automatically OTRI literature and the IDF performance during the war against
Hezbollah. As one officer told us, “The work of OTRI
was debatable but it was not the reason why we failed
during the July war.”31
Critics of OTRI’s inclination to post-modern thinking were usually coupled with critics of the overreliance of the Joint Staff on airpower, a matter that relates directly to the personality of the Chief of Staff
Dan Halutz. A controversial figure, Halutz had contemplated several times in public statements the belief that war could be won solely by airpower. Back
in 2001, as the Israeli Air Force Chief, Halutz stated:
“Victory is a matter of consciousness. Airpower affects
the adversary’s consciousness significantly.” A year
later, he also declared straightforwardly, “Airpower
alone can decide, and let alone be the senior partner
to such decision.”32 Facing this salvo of incriminat-
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ing reports, in September 2007 the IDF announced its
new 5-year procurement plan named “Tefen 2012”
that projected investments of $60 billion, in particular
to upgrade ground forces with hundreds of Merkava
Mk4 tanks, command and control structures, and
unmanned systems.
With the increasing concerns over Iran’s nuclear
program and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) strike on
a Syrian reactor in September 2007, the issue of the
Lebanese front, although unsettled, was moved to the
background. Discussions and exchanges continued
inside the IDF and defense-related think tanks, but
after a year and a major institutional crisis, the Israeli
political system was moving on. It would take another
year before the predicament of Israel’s posture vis-àvis Hezbollah resurfaced in the media. On October
3, 2008, Major General Gadi Eisenkot, then Israeli
Northern Commander, accepted an interview with
the newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, to discuss the current state of security in Northern Israel. When asked
about the likelihood of a new conflict against Hezbollah, Eisenkot straightforwardly declared that:
What happened in the Dahya quarter in Beirut in 2006
will happen in every village from which Israel is fired
on. We will apply disproportionate force on it and
cause great damage and destruction there.

He went on to say, “From our standpoint, these are
not civilian villages, they are military bases.” Leaving no space for ambiguity, Eisenkot added “This
is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has
been approved.”33
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Dahya (Arabic for “suburbs”) commonly designates the name of a densely populated group of Shia
neighborhoods in southern Beirut where Hezbollah’s
headquarters are located.34 During the first days of the
2006 war, it was the target of massive air strikes by
the IAF. In the weeks following Eisenkot’s remarks,
intense speculations grew in both Israeli and foreign
media regarding the implementation by the IDF of a
warfighting posture that would derive from the Dahya
strategy inspired by Eisenkot’s interview and whether
that might trigger a new conflict with Hezbollah. In
fact, the debate was mainly based on a set of military
ideas promoted by three close thinkers: Gadi Eisenkot, the Major General who headed the Military Operations Directorate of the General Staff when the 2006
war broke out; Gabi Siboni, a retired IDF colonel and a
research fellow from Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and who commanded the Golani
Brigade just as Eisenkot and both are said to be “close
friends;”35 and Giora Eiland, a retired Major General
and former National Security Advisor who left this
position in June 2006 to become a research fellow at
the INSS as well.
A few days after Eisenkot’s interview, Gabi Siboni, published an article on the INSS website titled
“Disproportionate Force: Israel’s Concept of Response
in Light of the Second Lebanon War.” Similarly to
Eisenkot’s statement, Siboni explained that, “With
an outbreak of hostilities, the IDF will need to act
immediately, decisively, and with force that is disproportionate to the enemy’s actions and the threat
it poses.”36 Furthermore, 1 month after Siboni’s and
Eisenkot’s arguments, Giora Eiland explored the very
same ideas in an article of the INSS in-house journal,
Strategic Assessment:

17

There is one way to prevent the Third Lebanon War
and win it if it does break out . . . to make it clear to
Lebanon’s allies and through them to the Lebanese
government and people that the next war will be between Israel and Lebanon and not between Israel and
Hezbollah. Such a war will lead to the elimination of
the Lebanese military, the destruction of the national
infrastructure, and intense suffering among the population. There will be no recurrence of the situation
where Beirut residents (not including the Dahya quarter) go to the beach and cafes while Haifa residents sit
in bomb shelters.37

Despite journalistic speculations, Siboni, Eisenkot,
and Eiland did not pretend to represent a particular
school of military thought. In fact, their views were
reminiscent of past Israeli statements on the use of
force as viewed in the previous chapter. Still, the speculations on the Dahya strategy were exacerbated further after the IDF conducted Operation CAST LEAD
against Hamas in the Gaza Strip from December 27,
2008, to January 18, 2009. This major operation aimed
at putting an end to the rocket attacks conducted either
by Hamas or militias in the Gaza Strip. The first phase
started with an air campaign relying on F-16 fighter
jets and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters that targeted
homes of Palestinian militiamen and command posts,
but it also led to the destruction of public infrastructures. It was then followed by a ground invasion, Israeli tanks and troops seizing control of large parts of
the Palestinian territory.
The operation triggered a major international controversy. In late-2009, the UN formed a mission conducting an investigation into the 2009 Gaza conflict
between the IDF and the Palestinian organization,
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Hamas. While looking in retrospect at the Eisenkot’s
statements, as well as at Siboni and Eiland’s writings,
the UN mission concluded that the Dahya strategy had
indeed been applied in the Gaza Strip. The much-discussed report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the
Gaza Conflict (popularly referenced as the Goldstone
Report in the name of the head of the UN Mission)
extensively quotes Eisenkot’s interview to affirm that:
the mission does not have to consider whether Israeli
military officials were directly influenced by these
writings. It is able to conclude from a review of the
facts on the ground that it witnessed for itself that
what is prescribed as the best strategy appears to have
been precisely what was put into practice.38

To this day, IDF officials strictly deny any linkage
between Eisenkot’s ideas and the conduct of Operation
CAST LEAD. Some officers underline that the Dahya
strategy is tailored for Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah, not with Hamas. Others downplay the relevance
of the so-called strategy as “a mere topic constructed
by the media.”39 When asked, Gabi Siboni answered
that “This is no more than folkore, Dahya is a concept,
nothing more.”40 The truth lies in between. It may be
misleading at operational level to believe the 2008
war in the Gaza Strip was the application of a military
doctrine born of the confrontation with Hezbollah 2
years before. Still, the response of the IDF to the Palestinian groups surely restored and reemphasized its
resolve and credibility. In that perspective, it could be
seen as an indirect way to enforce deterrence on the
northern front.
This constitutes no revolution as it relates clearly
to Israel’s traditional strategic culture and deterrence
thinking. The real novelty is that this Israeli calculus
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of deterrence, historically designed against the Arab
militaries, was now considered to be relevant in front
of Hezbollah. This change in Israel’s military posture
vis-à-vis Hezbollah is based on two major conclusions
drawn from the 2006 war. First, the air strikes against
Hezbollah’s headquarters in the first days were considered to be effective. Their scale took Secretary General Nasrallah and his inner circle by surprise, but
moreover they severely weakened the command and
control structure of Hezbollah’s military body. This
statement contradicts explicitly the popular narrative
that aerial bombardments did not work, and that the
IDF’s failures were, in fact, caused by their overreliance on this instrument of military power.41 On the
contrary, the advocates of the Dahya concept argue
that these strikes were effective, but were not leveraged at the political level due to unclear objectives.
Furthermore, the tense debates between Israel’s prime
minister office and the U.S. State Department on the
need to avoid targeting Lebanese infrastructures had
blurred Israel’s resolve.
For the proponents of the Dahya concept, this leads
to the second conclusion. The distinction between
Lebanese authorities and Hezbollah was allegedly
counterproductive because of the U.S. diplomatic call
to Israel for restraint concerning Lebanese targets that
impeded the IDF’s ability to coerce the Party of God.
Eiland’s, Siboni’s, and Eisenkot’s statements are explicit. The air strikes should indistinctly be extended
to Lebanese infrastructures. This reasoning takes
into account Hezbollah’s increased influence within
the Lebanese State since the conflict of 2006. Following the June 2009 elections, Hezbollah held 13 seats
in the 128-member Lebanese Parliament and two in
the cabinet. Moreover, in a December 2009 vote, the
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Lebanese Parliament allowed Hezbollah to retain its
arsenal of weapons. Furthermore, the Israelis carefully observed the violent clashes between Hezbollah
and Sunni Lebanese factions in Beirut in the Spring of
2008. For some Israeli thinkers, such clashes suggested
that a devastating Israeli retaliation on national facilities could turn the population against the Party.
The lessons from Israel’s intelligence failures prior
to the 2006 conflict, and in particular the realization
of the vast rocket and missile arsenal Hezbollah was
now controlling, is at the core of the Dahya concept.
Isreal also realizes that it cannot militarily destroy the
entire arsenal. It can degrade its scale, it can prevent
some flow of weapons coming from Iran and Syria,
but eventually it has to cope with it and accept a certain degree of vulnerability. Following his interview
with Yedioth Ahronoth, Eisenkot explained this phenomenon in a subsequent article written in 2010 for
INSS (Siboni’s and Eiland’s research center) titled
“A Changed Threat? The Response on the Northern
Arena.” For Eisenkot, Israeli planners face an evolving environment where the traditional scenario of a
surprise attack on Israel’s territory is shifting to “the
new reality that includes extensive rockets and missile
fire at Israeli population centers together with the use
of terrorism and guerrilla tactics.”42 In fact, Eisenkot
was already underlining this challenge in a research
paper written in 1997 for the U.S. Army. “As Israel’s
neighbours begin to acquire long range missiles, the
strategic balance in the region will shift, and Israel
will be required to adapt its strategic posture.”43
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Eiland also emphasizes the fact that:
the number of long and medium range rockets within
the overall arsenal skyrocketed, which will enable Hezbollah to continue firing even if Israel occupies the
entire area between the border and the Litani River.44

Siboni portrays this shift as the new strategic concept
of Israel’s enemies:
The size of Israel and the fact that it has no strategic
depth made Israel’s enemies assume that high trajectory fire aimed at the Israeli home front in large quantities and with a minimum of variables would allow
them to achieve their goal.45

The proliferation of these vectors, in particular
those possessed by Hezbollah, upsets Israeli historical efforts to protect its territory at all costs. Since the
late-1940s, Israel’s strategic culture has been shaped
by constraints such as its absence of strategic depth
and its limited manpower, leaving the country at the
mercy of protracted conflicts that could endanger its
very existence. To bypass these elements, Israeli leaders opted for offensive doctrines enabling the launching of preemptive campaigns that would swiftly move
the battles to enemy territory. For Arab states such as
Egypt and Syria, ballistic missiles proved the perfect
instrument to circumvent Israel’s military dominance.
Missiles disrupt classic air power and constitute a major challenge to homeland defense.
This is why the evolving thinking of Israel vis-àvis Hezbollah also relates to Israel’s experience with
missile defenses which are becoming a key feature of
its military posture against such groups. For the Israeli policymakers, the first wake-up call with regards
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to the missile threat came with the war of the cities
between Iran and Iraq in 1988, during which Saddam
Hussein used Scud missile strikes against Tehran as
a new weapon of coercion. At first, the political class
in Jerusalem justified development of missile defense
in the name of pragmatism and opportunism. Israeli
politicians became aware that the security—or the
sanctuarization—of their territory had come to be
jeopardized by increasing regional proliferation. It
was also an opportunistic move, because Israel was
taking advantage of the early impetus in Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Within this cooperation framework, the burden of developing the systems
was mostly taken on by the United States.
The second and crucial game changer was the 2006
war. The ability of Hezbollah to reach Israel urban
sites even during the last days of the war evidenced
for Israeli planners the necessity to reconsider their
traditional neglect of defensive means. The result was
the building of the Israeli-made system, Iron Dome.
Missile defense has become a precious tool for the
Israeli government. It reassures citizens of their safety
and mitigates the psychological effects of missile warfare. But because of the various systems developed or
under development in Israel, there is widespread confusion over the exact level of readiness and coverage
of its missile defense architecture. Given the current
passion of Israeli politicians for these systems, party
leaders and government officials maintain a kind of
ambiguity regarding the ultimate objective of missile
defense and frequently imply that these systems aim
at defending the homeland as a whole. In reality, what
the existing systems protect is, first and foremost, critical infrastructure and military bases. Major General
Eisenkot, Deputy Chief of Staff of the IDF, triggered a
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public controversy during a speech at the University
of Haifa in 2010 when he stated:
The residents of Israel shouldn’t be under the illusion
that someone will open an umbrella over their heads.
. . the systems are designed to protect military bases,
even if this means that citizens suffer discomfort during the first days of battle.46

It is the essential reason why missile defense efforts,
and in particular the recent successes of Iron Dome,47
do not translate into a rebalancing between offensive
and defensive tenets for the Israeli military. In the case
of Israel-Hezbollah competition, they complement the
deterrence posture as reflected by the Dahya debate,
but they certainly do not constitute the sole answer.
This is also the reason why the IDF recently built
a new corps named the Depth Corps, a special unit
to coordinate and conduct clandestine operations in
enemy territory against missile- and rocket-launcher
sites. This new corps reflects the continuing will of the
IDF to retain the option of preemptive strikes.48
In a nutshell, the scenario that drives Israel’s contemporary military thinking regarding its northern
front can be imagined as beginning with a provocation
from Hezbollah, such as abducting Israeli soldiers or
launching rockets on civilian areas of northern Israel.
Then Israel responds with massive IAF air strikes on
Beirut and southern Lebanon combined with a small
contingent of forward ground forces operating in
Lebanon to destroy rocket-launching sites, and missile defense systems on alert to intercept projectiles.
This combination is expected to lead to a rapid coercion of the Party of God. The issue with this thinking is that, as for many deterrence doctrines, Israeli
posture posits an exclusive bilateral competition with
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Hezbollah. This prerequisite is essential for the stability of the deterrence approach, but it means that any
exogenous change impacting the competition is likely
to jeopardize the calculus. As we will see in the last
section, such game changers do exist.
HEZBOLLAH’S LESSONS
For Hezbollah, the 2006 war resembled less a
catastrophic failure than a well-timed opportunity
to restore its image as freedom fighters 6 years after
Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon and to regain political leverage inside Lebanon a year after the
Syrian military left the country. Whereas Hezbollah
looked isolated in the spring of 2006, it would exit the
war in August galvanized.49 Despite the very fact that
its military structures, either in the South or in Beirut, were destroyed by the Israeli air strikes and that
its manpower had been likewise reduced following
the battle with Israeli ground forces, Hezbollah made
all efforts at the end of the war to paint itself as the
victorious one.50
In retrospect, Nasrallah turned an ill-conceived
provocation against Israel into a demonstration of Hezbollah’s power to coerce the Zionist entity, and an
illustration that the Party of God was the ultimate defender of the Arab cause in the region. In this 34-day
war, the endurance of Hezbollah vis-à-vis the powerful Israeli forces took Arab rulers by surprise. At first,
many of the latter condemned Hezbollah’s aggression
at the Israel-Lebanon border as an irresponsible act
that triggered the war. But the intensity and the scale
of Israel’s reaction, coupled with the ability of the
Lebanese organization to continue defying the IDF,
changed the mind-set of Arab public opinion in such
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a way that Arab leaders in Beirut, Cairo, and in Gulf
capitals revised their initial condemnation. Hezbollah’s military performance was an embarrassment for
many old Arab rulers because it indirectly underlined
the failure of Arab conventional armies which have
never achieved this level of resistance against Israel.
A previous study conducted for the U.S. Army War
College evidenced this reality:
Hezbollah inflicted more Israeli casualties per Arab
fighter in 2006 than did any of Israel’s state opponents
in the 1956, 1967, 1973, or 1982 Arab-Israeli interstate
wars. Hezbollah’s skills in conventional warfighting
were clearly imperfect in 2006—but they were also
well within the observed bounds of other state military actors in the Middle East and elsewhere, and significantly superior to many such states.51

As a result, the first objective Hezbollah needed
to obtain by September 2006 was obvious: to convert
the military capital it acquired through the war into
political capital. In the weeks prior to the July war,
Hezbollah was under severe pressure because of the
battle between Lebanon’s pro- and anti-Syria political
blocs that had been triggered by the 2005 assassination of Rafic Hariri, the former prime minister and
opponent to Syrian military occupation. Suddenly,
after the end of the conflict, Hezbollah’s political latitude vis-à-vis the government of Fouad Siniora was
greatly expanded.
In a speech given a month later, Nasrallah stated
that “Tears don’t protect anyone,” an explicit reference to Siniora, who wept several times in official
speeches during the July war. Nasrallah went on, “No
army in the world will be able to make us drop the
weapons from our hands.” In the same speech, Nas-
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rallah described the war as “a divine, historic and strategic victory.”52 Since then, the expression of “divine
victory” became the authoritative expression to depict
the conflict in all Hezbollah’s official literature.53
The narrative conveyed in Hezbollah’s literature
and public declarations balanced between sacred references and nationalistic claims in order to preempt
critics at political level on the risks endured by Lebanon because of its agenda. As a result, the 2006 war
quickly became part of the mythology of the Party,
inspiring numerous urban legends about fighters that
bravely defeated the Israelis in the fights of the South
Lebanon villages.54 But beyond the making of such
glorious and quasi-mythological narratives, the leadership of Hezbollah was fully aware that, to preserve
its political gains on the long haul, it had not only to
rearm but also to reassess its military strategy.
Various sources suggest that in the same way that
the IDF implemented a thorough process of lessons
learned after the July War, Hezbollah, along with the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards, conducted their own
comprehensive after-action review.55 But whereas Israel’s political and military establishment underwent
a bottom-up rethinking of its strategy, for Hezbollah,
the 2006 war confirmed that its increasing reliance on
rocket and missile warfare had been the best strategic
option taken by the organization to circumvent Israeli
military power. Hezbollah’s rockets flying over Haifa
and other cities awed the Israeli public and produced
a sentiment of high vulnerability among the population. For Hezbollah, this meant that its arsenal could
compel Israeli governments to yield in the future.
However, aside from the declaratory bravado of Nasrallah, the war was surely not a military victory: the
massive destruction of its headquarters in the sub-
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urbs of Beirut and South Lebanon severely disrupted
the chain of command of operations and evidenced
obvious loopholes in the air defense capabilities of
the Party.
In the years following the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah
therefore focused on this revised strategic calculus: to
invest in rockets and missiles with improved range
and accuracy, while acquiring air defense systems.
The logic was to strengthen the resolve of the Party
to strike Israel deep inside its territory and to enhance
the ability of Hezbollah to mitigate, or at least absorb,
the impact of an Israeli bombing campaign through
defensive means.
Today, the number of rockets and missiles under
the control of Hezbollah is difficult to know. In September 2008, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak
estimated that they counted 40,000 rockets. One year
later, President Shimon Peres suggested that the figure was close to 80,000.56 IDF officials interviewed
for our research stated that the number was approximately 42,000 rockets plus 4,000 short- to mid-range
missiles.57
The quality of the arsenal dramatically improved
as Hezbollah acquired rockets using guidance systems
and with extended range. During that same period,
the arms race crossed a new threshold as Hezbollah
started acquiring ballistic missiles. It is believed that,
through Syria, the Party acquired M-600 short-range
ballistic missiles, a variant of the Fateh-110, which can
carry a 1,100-pound warhead and has a range of 210
kilometers (km).58 According to weapon engineers,
the inertial guidance system of the M-600 enables
the missile to strike within 500 yards of a target at
maximum range.
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In the months that followed the July War, Israel expressed numerous threats of retaliation and stressed
red lines regarding the new build-up conducted by
Hezbollah. As the war was still vivid in Israeli memories, the Israeli Joint Staff may have feared that Hezbollah would rapidly rearm. It may have feared
that Hezbollah, being emboldened by the last round,
would dare to trigger a new confrontation. Only a
month after the ceasefire, Nasrallah was indeed declaring “Today, 22 September, 2006, the resistance
is stronger than any time since 1982.”59 Nasrallah’s
statement was not grounded in operational realities,
but reflected the bolstered behavior of Hezbollah in
the post-war period. In the following months, Israeli
authorities repeatedly made the case to their Western
counterparts that Hezbollah was acquiring capabilities that challenged the post-cease fire status quo. But
still the IDF showed restraint.
To conduct the rearmament of Hezbollah, cooperation with Syria and Iran proved even more crucial than
prior to the 2006 war. In the first months that followed
the war, the man at the center of this cooperative effort was Imad Mughniyeh, an historical figure of Hezbollah’s military branch whose reputation as one of
the most wanted terrorists in the world had reached a
quasi-mystical level among terrorism experts. According to the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Akhbar, Mughniyeh
had been put in charge of the post-2006 buildup, an effort that he conducted in coordination with his inner
contacts in Syria and Iran.60 Mughniyeh did so until
the evening of February 12, 2008, when he was killed
when his car exploded in the Kfar Sousa neighborhood of Damascus. Details of this operation are still
lacking, but it inflicted a severe blow to Hezbollah.
Although one needs to remain cautious on the conjec-

29

tures that surround any discussion of Mughniyeh, the
location of his assassination, Damascus, revealed the
close cooperation between Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah
in the aftermath of the 2006 war.
In the case of Syria, this reinvigorated cooperation
was the result of the new approach taken by President Bashar al-Assad vis-à-vis Hezbollah. In the years
following Bashar's rise to power Nasrallah became a
regular visitor to Damascus, and the new Syrian president did not hesitate to be seen publicly with him. The
Syrian regime cast aside the elder Assad’s restraint
and developed the idea of an anti-imperialist axis represented by Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran. As a sign of
this evolution, during the 2006 summer war between
Israel and Hezbollah, the streets of Damascus and
Homs were littered with flyers proclaiming the glory
of the movement, and Nasrallah in particular.
On top of this political support, Syria has lent considerable logistical support to the Party of God’s military structure, particularly by maintaining the supply
corridors used by Iran to supply missiles and other
arms to Hezbollah. If Hezbollah’s current missile
strike force constitutes a real tool of dissuasion to the
Jewish state rather than a simple nuisance to northern
Israel, it is largely thanks to Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian
regime. This was explicitly acknowledged by Nasrallah in 2012 during a speech he gave on the 6th anniversary of the July War:
Syria is a path for the Resistance and a bridge of communication between the Resistance and Iran. . . . I have
two [proofs] for Syria’s role [in supporting the Resistance]. The first one is that the most important rockets that targeted Haifa and the center of ‘Israel’ were
made by Syrian military and given to the Resistance.
Syria was an aid to the Resistance and gave weapons
that we used in the July War.61
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On numerous occasions, these transfers led American officials to incriminate the Syrian authorities. In
February 2009, U.S. Director for National Intelligence
Dennis Blair stated explicitly that “Syrian military
support to Hezbollah has increased substantially
over the past 5 years, especially since the 2006 IsraelHezbollah war.” A year later, in testimony before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ambassador Jeffrey
Feltman declared that “the Syrian Army’s 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon and Hezbollah’s 2006 conflict
with Israel deepened the strategic interdependence
between the Syrian state and Hezbollah.”62
During that same period, Syria was accused of
transferring Scud-D ballistic missiles to Hezbollah.
With a range of 700-km, Scud-D missiles could reach
either Jerusalem or Tel Aviv. Although Syrian authorities denied the charges, the U.S. State Department issued a statement, saying:
the United States condemns in the strongest terms the
transfer of any arms, and especially ballistic missile
systems such as the Scud, from Syria to Hezbollah. . . .
The transfer of these arms can only have a destabilizing effect on the region, and would pose an immediate
threat to both the security of Israel and the sovereignty
of Lebanon.63

This transfer followed a first allegation that the
Syrian regime had provided Hezbollah with M-600
missiles. There have been also rumors that Syria had
provided Hezbollah with surface-to-air missile systems including the SA-2, SA-8, and the SA-24. The
two last ones are mobile systems, easy to conceal, and
would represent key assets for air defense if Israel was
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to launch a bombing campaign.64 In addition, Hezbollah’s men are said to have been sent to Syria for training on the SA-8 system. Likewise, Nicholas Blanford
and Bilal Saab reported that “Hezbollah may also
have acquired the Misagh-2 shoulder fired missile
produced in Iran and based on Chinese technology.”65
This man-portable low- to very-low-altitude surfaceto-air missile would prove crucial if Hezbollah fighters were under air attacks from the IDF.
All these developments reflected the coherent reaction of Hezbollah following its strategic review of
the July War, in particular the lesson that improved
air defense systems were crucially needed. A month
later, Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, the Intelligence
Research Director of the IDF, stated before the Israeli
Knesset:
Hezbollah has an arsenal of thousands of rockets of
all types and ranges, including long-range solid-fuel
rockets and more precise rockets. . . . The long-range
missiles in Hezbollah’s possession enable them to
fix their launch areas deep inside Lebanon, and they
cover longer, larger ranges than what we have come
across in the past. Hezbollah of 2006 is different from
Hezbollah of 2010 in terms its military capabilities,
which have developed significantly.66

Baidatz went on to underline the change of
patterns in the Hezbollah-Syria-Iran cooperation
framework:
Weapons are transferred to Hezbollah on a regular
basis and this transfer is organized by the Syrian and
Iranian regimes. Therefore, it should not be called
smuggling of arms to Lebanon—it is organized and
official transfer.67
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But if Hezbollah increased and improved its arsenal, it also adapted to two new developments: the deployment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) forces in South Lebanon and the new efforts of
Israeli forces to detect its launcher sites. Following the
July war, the UN Security Council decided that the
UNIFIL forces, initially created in 1978 in the midst
of Israel’s intervention in Lebanon, would be now deployed in the South to enforce the ceasefire concluded
in August 2006. Initially UNIFIL was to be staffed
with 15,000 soldiers, but contributing nations never
provided more than 13,000 men. Obviously, such a
mission should have challenged Hezbollah’s power
in South Lebanon, its historical stronghold. In reality,
UNIFIL had to cope with Hezbollah, rather than the
other way around. As a French official in the Ministry of Defense reminded, “UNIFIL heavily relies on
cooperation with Hezbollah, there is no way it could
perform its mission without this form of tacit coexistence.”68 For several years, the arrangements UNIFIL
had to make in some of the South Lebanon villages
where Hezbollah rules have been documented. Additionally, UNIFIL officers were fully aware of Hezbollah’s military build-up in the area, a fait accompli that
contravenes the idea of UN Resolution 1701 to establish “between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an
area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons
other than those of the Government of Lebanon and
of UNIFIL deployed in this area.”69 Still, pragmatism
prevailed, and there was an implicit division of labor
which allowed UNIFIL forces to monitor certain areas
while letting Hezbollah maintain its hold in others.
Meanwhile, Israel’s new emphasis on intelligence
to detect and destroy Hezbollah’s launcher sites urged
the Party to rethink the location of these sites. As a
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result, Hezbollah is said to have moved them further north in the countryside. In March 2011, the IDF
leaked to the Washington Post a map that showed 1,000
bunkers, hidden weapons storage facilities, and surveillance sites spread all around Lebanon, whether in
the north or in the Bekaa valley.

Source: “Israeli military maps Hezbollah bunkers,”Washington
Post.70

Map 1. Hezbollah Underground Infrastructure
in South Lebanon.
This repositioning of Hezbollah’s sites has several
consequences. First, it deemphasizes the place of South
Lebanon as the center of gravity for a future conflict.
Second, it underlines the growing range of the Party’s
arsenal if that arsenal can be stationed far away from
the Israel-Lebanon border. Overall, this means that a
new confrontation would look more like an air war
than a long and massive war in the Southern villages.
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This obviously relates to Israel’s own evolution
with the Dahya debate discussed earlier in this monograph. Since 2006, strategic stability between Israel
and Hezbollah has not only been reached by the new
balance of forces that prevailed but also by indirect
dialogue. This dialogue does not equal concrete backchannel meetings but rather ostentatious public communication on both sides to convey its message to
the other, the result being that each competitor better
knows the culture and mind-set of the other. In the
case of Hezbollah, this understanding of Israel should
not be underestimated. It transpires from the multiple
statements made by Hassan Nasrallah and other leaders of the Party. Indeed, Hezbollah’s strategists seem
to have a fine comprehension of Israel’s evolving military posture, but furthermore they have been discussing Israeli strategy at length through public speeches
or propaganda books. On numerous occasions since
the July War, Nasrallah detailed his vision of the Party’s arsenal as a deterrent against the IDF new buildup. In the last years, one of the best-selling DVDs of
Nasrallah’s speeches in Lebanon is the so-called Khitaab al radaa’ (Speech of the deterrence). In this 1-hour
speech, Nasrallah talks directly to the IDF saying:
They think they can demolish Dahya’s buildings as
we barely ‘puncture their walls’. But I tell them today:
You destroy a Dahya building and we will destroy
buildings in Tel Aviv. . . . If you target Beirut’s Rafik
Hariri International Airport, we will strike Tel Aviv’s
Ben Gurion International Airport. If you target our
electricity stations, we will target yours. If you target
our plants, we will target yours.71

Some parts of the video are used in the inaugural documentary that is aired at the entrance of the
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Mleeta Resistance Museum built by Hezbollah in the
South after the 2006 war. The Museum itself is filled
with messages of deterrence such as maps of Israeli
locations in the range of Hezbollah’s missiles. (See
Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Propaganda Poster in the Mleeta Museum,
“If you strike . . . we will strike.”72
In fact, the more Israel was discussing the Dahya
concept, the more Hassan Nasrallah insisted on Hezbollah’s abilities to retaliate. In May 2010, he was
again talking to the Israeli decisionmakers, saying in
a public speech:
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If you blockade our coastline, shores and ports, all military and commercial ships heading toward Palestine
throughout the Mediterranean Sea will be targeted by
the rockets of the Islamic Resistance.73

A year later, he threatened an invasion of the
Galilee if Israel was to launch a new war on Lebanon:
I’m telling the fighters of the Islamic resistance: Be
ready for the day, should war be forced upon Lebanon, where the resistance’s leadership will ask you to
take over the Galilee.74

For Hezbollah, such deterrence rhetoric is a double-edge sword. It shapes implicit and explicit redlines
for escalation and therefore it dissipates uncertainties
vis-à-vis Israel on the likelihood of a new conflict. But
through that process, Hezbollah must indirectly recognize its adversary as a political entity. So, in return,
the revolutionary design of the Party fades away,
and it becomes a defensive and status-quo centered
political force.
Scholarship in security studies shows that deterrence remains a stable system as long as each of the
competitors maintains a robust chain of command
which strictly controls its means of deterrence.75 However, Hezbollah has never been an autonomous actor
which indigenously built its deterrent. It relied and
still relies substantially on the regimes in Syria and
Iran. Moreover, even though the Party remains the
biggest security actor in Lebanon, it does not specifically control its territory. In fact, the most interesting
paradox may be that the more Hezbollah becomes
a military power able to deter Israel, the more it depends on external actors and the more it puts the domestic stability in Lebanon at risk.
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The spreading of Hezbollah’s military posts deep
inside the country changes the internal equation between the Party and the Lebanese forces. More precisely, it exacerbates the ascendant of the former on
the latter. It gives even more relevance to the Israeli
calculus to consider the Lebanese government to be
responsible for Hezbollah’s operations against Israel.
This also reveals the fundamental caveat in the deterrence game between Hezbollah and Israel. The very
fact that even though Hezbollah is a well-structured,
well-trained military organization, it still remains a
nonstate actor competing with regular forces on the
same territory.
It is widely known in Beirut and elsewhere that
there is a tacit agreement between Hezbollah and
Lebanese armed forces over the control of the national
territory. As a result, order and security in the southern region as well as Southern Beirut are provided by
Hezbollah. But at political level, the deterrence calculus vis-à-vis Israel also reads as a convenient way for
Hezbollah to sell the rationale for maintaining its hold
on its arsenal and avoiding any disarmament inside
Lebanon. In a way, one could argue that the current
deterrence rhetoric that emerged in Hezbollah’s statements since the 2000s replaced the resistance rhetoric.
Even though this latter is still present, the movement
transformed itself into a defensive organization rather than a revolutionary one. This subtle change was
coined by some pundits close to Hezbollah, “Resistance in defensive mode.” Months after the July War,
Deputy Secretary General of the Party Sheikh Naim
Qasim acknowledged this evolution:
Our objective is not to wage a conventional war, nor to
maintain positions or carry weapons for public show.
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Our aim is to have the capability to defend, in the
event of an aggression.

He goes on, “As long as Israel remains aggressive
in the region, we must fear this aggression. These
arms will then remain to confront and defend against
aggression.”76
To understand the domestic dimension of the uses
of a deterrence rhetoric vis-à-vis Israel, one has to be
mindful of the pressures facing Hezbollah since 2006.
In fact, the 2006 War put a momentary hold on the
long struggle between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian
forces in Lebanon. But less than 2 years later, hostilities started again. In May 2008, the government decided to reassign the commander of security at Beirut International Airport, Brigadier General Wafiq
Shuqeir, to the Army Command as he was suspected
of working closely with Hezbollah. Additionally, the
Lebanese government declared Hezbollah’s telecommunications network illegal, calling it “a threat to
state security.”77 In response to this challenge, Hezbollah took to the streets and led an operation to take
over West Beirut (mainly the Sunni neighborhood). In
less than 12 hours, Hezbollah-affiliated militias were
outnumbering police and military forces.78 After more
than a week, pro-government and opposition factions
agreed to cease the hostilities and to revoke the initial
decisions. Since then, the military power of Hezbollah
has not been challenged again, but the 2008 episode
is an enduring illustration of the long struggle inside
Lebanon between the Party and its Sunni rivals that
could be reignited in the coming years. The paradox
here is Israel’s interest on this issue. Over the long
term, Israel prefers a marginalized and weak Hezbollah, but on the short term, a strong Hezbollah in Beirut

39

means that command and control of its arsenal is secured, and decisionmaking is more or less predictable.
All in all, the development of a deterrence bargain
in the Israel-Hezbollah competition following the
2006 war should be neither underestimated nor overestimated. Stability has prevailed in the area because
of effective strategies on both sides to negate the edge
of the other. Hezbollah increased its offensive capabilities such as missiles and rockets, while building a
better air defense coverage. Meanwhile, Israel renovated its military position by relying on a deterrence
posture that mixes elements of punishment (the Dahya
concept) and denial (the rise of its missile defense systems). The bargain has proved effective, at least for the
last 7 years. But as we emphasized at the beginning of
this monograph, deterrence is a social construct that
is neither natural nor eternal. This is why it is also important to identify what could test and maybe disrupt
the deterrence stability between Israel and Hezbollah.
GAME CHANGERS IN THE
DETERRENCE SYSTEM
Faith in the stability of deterrence can sometimes
be driven by a retroactive illusion. It can inadvertently
neglect the critical rules and processes that are necessary to sustain this stability in the long term. As we
argued in the first section, a deterrence situation such
as the Israel-Hezbollah stand-off since 2006 is a social
construct emanating from strategic players. It is not
a natural state and requires constant adaptations to
mitigate the risks of miscalculation. This is why some
scholars of deterrence have argued that, paradoxically, we only know in retrospect if deterrence was working when a deterrence situation ends (e.g., the collapse
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of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]), or
fails (Israel-Arab wars).79
At the time of this writing, strategic stability between Israel and Hezbollah prevails because of the
mutual understanding that this remains the best outcome of their competition. However, this principle
only works as long as this competition is not altered
by external factors. This is why we need to be mindful
of the potential tests to the Israel-Hezbollah deterrence
equation. In this last section, we look at three major issues that may constitute such tests: the development
of the Syrian crisis, the Iranian nuclear issue, and the
evolution of Lebanese politics.
Opening the Syrian Front.
The Syrian crisis started in March 2011 in the midst
of uprisings in other Arab countries. Following the
first demonstrations in rural areas such as Deraa or
Deir el Zhor, the government of Bashar al-Assad reacted with a combination of timid pledges of reforms
and brutal repression. On a general basis, the fall of
Assad’s regime would represent a severe loss, both
politically and militarily, for Hezbollah. As explained
in the previous chapter, the Party benefited from
Bashar al-Assad which made Syria not only a zone of
transit for Iranian supplies to South Lebanon, but a
strategic partner that trained Hezbollah militants in
several domains, including air defense systems. This
explains why the leadership of the movement feels it
owes a strategic debt to Damascus.
During the first months, Hezbollah’s rulers preserved their traditional posture by offering full support to the Syrian regime. Many of the speeches given
by the Hezbollah secretary general concerning Syria
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denounced the predatory strategies of external powers (namely the United States and Israel) directed at
the Syrian regime and increasingly diverted the attention of his audiences to the seemingly more urgent
Palestinian cause. In other words, the movement developed a narrative of the crisis which was identical to
that presented by the government of Bashar al-Assad.
Meanwhile, the movement consistently denied all
implications stemming from certain media coverage,
notably emanating from the opposition Free Syrian
Army or Israeli sources, which has conjured up charges of Hezbollah’s role as a logistical and military supporter of the Syrian repression.
Things changed radically in the summer of 2012,
and more precisely after the July 18 bomb attack in
Damascus that killed several key officials of the Syrian security apparatus (among them Syrian Defense
Minister Dawoud Rajiha and Deputy Defense Minister Assef Shawkat). The attack occurred the same day
Nasrallah was scheduled to deliver a speech to celebrate the 6th anniversary of the victory against Israel.
In his final speech, Nasrallah chose not to circumvent
the Syrian issue, but to embrace Assad’s fight, praising
the role of Syrian leader in Hezbollah’s fight against
Israel and naming Assef Shawkat a martyr that helped
the Party’s acquisition of rockets that were launched
on Israel during the 2006 war.80
Following the attack of July 2012, the Syrian regime entered a new threshold in the escalation process and has resorted to extensive and indiscriminate
use of airpower over the major disputed urban centers
like Aleppo and Homs. In addition, there has been an
increasing involvement of Syria’s allies, Iran and Hezbollah, on the battlefield. During August and September 2012, hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards
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were deployed in Damascus to offer expertise such
as psychological warfare and monitoring of social
networks.81
With regards to Hezbollah, there have been since
the beginning of the revolution repeated cases of
clashes between its fighters and the Free Syrian Army
(FSA) in villages near the Syria-Lebanon border. But,
as the regime in Damascus faces crucial scarcity of
manpower due to desertion or defection, Hezbollah
and Iranian Pasdarans train pro-Assad militias such
as the Chabihas and Jeish al Chaa’bi to replace the
conventional forces in several parts of the country.
Conflict involving Hezbollah’s fighters intensified in the Lebanon-Syria border area, close to Homs.
In August 2012, Lebanese media revealed the death
of Musa Ali Shahimi, a commander of Hezbollah’s
military branch in this area. The circumstances of the
death were not clear, but in September, Ali Nassif,
another commander, died under the same conditions.
According to a declaration from the Free Syrian Army,
Nassif died in clashes in the town of Qusair. In this
same town, the Free Syrian Army allegedly captured
a dozen of Hezbollah’s fighters.
Things got worse in the following months as Hezbollah raised the level of its cooperation with Assad’s
forces. This reached a new threshold in the so-called
Qusair battle in the spring of 2013, during which the
Party of God openly fought on the Syrian soil against
the rebels. In late-May, Hassan Nasrallah publicly
acknowledged this involvement during one of his
speeches commemorating the 13th anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon. He asserted:
Where we need to be, we will be. Where we began to
assume our responsibilities, we will continue to as-
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sume our responsibilities. To defeat this very, very
dangerous conspiracy [against Syria] we will bear any
sacrifices and all the consequences.82

As Hezbollah’s calculus evolved during the Syrian
crisis, so did the Israeli’s. At first, the general mindset,
as drawn from interviews with officers and civilian
decisionmakers, showed a very cautious perspective. After all, there was no reason to predict the fall
of Assad as the Israel-Syria border had been quiet
since the 1973 war. In other words, it was better to
cope with a “devil that you know than with one you
don’t.”83 But the realization that the Syria problem
was not a purely internal crisis that could be contained
and disconnected from regional dynamics led Israelis
to reevaluate the risks of escalation, in particular as
the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah on the Syrian
battlefield increased.
Starting in the fall of 2012, Israeli officials emphasized the fact that they considered any transfer of Syrian advanced weaponry to a third party to be a game
changer in the Syrian crisis. A Hezbollah armed with
Syrian chemical weapons or mid-range ballistic missiles raises the level of vulnerability of Israel’s territory and eventually defies the status quo. This rationale has been put to the test more and more, and has
led to concrete military action at least twice. While the
Golan Heights have been the theater of several skirmishes over several months, it is the January 30 Israeli
airstrike in Jamraya, deep inside Syrian territory, that
refreshed the prospects of a regionalization of the
Syrian battlefield and the reopening of the Lebanese
front. The Israeli strike allegedly targeted a convoy of
weapons being transferred to Hezbollah. According
to several Western media, the weapons included the
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Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) mobile medium-range antiaircraft system.84 For other media like the Saudi newspaper, Al Watan, the convoy may even have contained
chemical weapons.85
Following this operation, all parties showed restraint, but it remains to be seen for how long this
shaky balance can prevail. In fact, as counterintuitive
it may seem, the Israeli strike attempted to contain the
crisis to the Syrian territory rather than to regionalize
it. In other words, it can be read as a means to disconnect the Syrian front from the Lebanese one. It aimed
at maintaining the deterrence system between Israeli
forces and Hezbollah that is effective as long as it remains isolated from other theaters in the Middle East.
However, the more Hezbollah gets bogged down
in Syria, the more the disconnection between the two
fronts is difficult to sustain. This was evidenced a second time in the night between Saturday, May 4, and
Sunday, May 5, 2013, when Israeli jets conducted a
new raid over the Damascus suburbs in order to destroy arms supplies. This time, according to Western
intelligence sources, “What was attacked were stores
of Fateh-110 missiles that were in transit from Iran
to Hezbollah.”86 The scope of this second air operation was wider, targets including at least three sites,
among them the exact same compound in Jamraya as
on January 30. Although Hezbollah, as well as Syrian
and Iranian regimes, were more vocal in their condemnation of this second raid, it did not trigger a new
escalation step.
To be sure, if Hezbollah was to acquire chemical
weapons or improved air defense means, the deterrence equilibrium with Israel might be altered. However, the idea of Syria transferring such systems in the
middle of its civil war is questionable. The rationale
for Assad to give Hezbollah an arsenal that he needs
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to express his own resolve to deter foreign intervention is shallow. Even regarding the Party of God itself,
it postulates that the organization would be ready to
gamble on Israel’s restraint in front of such transfer. If
necessary, the two air strikes conveyed the message
that the Israelis would not accept a change in the military equation on their northern front. Additionally,
some observers argue that Hezbollah has been fabricating its own rocket arsenal “for at least 4-5 years” in
order to decrease its reliance on Syrian supply lines.87
But the rationality of each actor cannot predict
solely the regional dynamics of the Syrian conflict.
The more the crisis extends to the Middle East, the
more the strategic balance becomes precarious and
the greater the likelihood of misperceptions leading
to ill-advised, potentially disastrous decisions. Moreover, with Assad’s fight for survival, Hezbollah, just
like Iran, is facing what Glenn Snyder calls the “security dilemma in alliance politics:” the more an alliance strengthens the ties and solidarity among its
members, the more these are vulnerable to reckless
decisions from one of them.88
However, at the time of writing this research, the
grammar of the Israel-Hezbollah deterrence game remained solid despite the Syrian crisis. The real change
in the calculus of all sides is the geography of their
competition: The risk of escalation is prevented as
long as the clashes involving the various actors are
situated inside Syria and limited to its territory. This
is an important development that can be compared to
the way Lebanon became the buffer zone between Israel and Syria and Iran during its civil war. All during
the Lebanese civil war, the regional players drew new
redlines, using proxies and delimiting certain areas of
influences. As the conflict lasts in Syria, we may be
witnessing the same evolution.
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Deciphering Lebanese Politics.
As discussed in the previous section, the deterrence equation between Israel and Hezbollah also relies on the ability of the latter to maintain the current
status quo within Lebanon regarding its military power. In many ways, distinguishing between Hezbollah’s
Lebanese politics and regional strategies is arbitrary,
as Lebanese politics have historically been driven by
the competing agendas of its neighbors—Israel and
Syria—but also those of regional players—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Western powers of the United
States and France. As a Beirut-insider joked, “the essence of being a Lebanese politician is to be someone
else’s proxy.”89
The current tensions in Lebanon over Hezbollah’s
military support to the Syrian regime of Bashar alAssad did not suddenly come to light with the Syrian crisis, they had been looming for several years.
In fact, one could say that the sectarian character of
on-going disputes and fights in Lebanon is reminiscent of the civil war and the loosely stable political
system that emerged from these years, with the Taef
agreements signed in 1989. The question of Hezbollah’s arms might have been dormant during the Israeli
occupation, but in the years that followed, the Party
went under growing pressure from its multiple Sunni
and Christian opponents in Beirut that considered
its arsenal to undermine the building of a genuine
Lebanese military.
In 2005, the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was
believed to be a tipping point that would lead to the
disarming of the Party. However the war of 2006 only
adjourned the major internal crisis which eventually
ensued in 2008 with the Sunni-Shia clashes in Beirut.
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Like all post-civil war settlements in Lebanon, the
Doha agreement signed that same year was more or
a less a way to perpetuate the bargain between all the
political forces.
In that perspective, the uprisings in Syria did not
alter Lebanese politics, they reminded and reinforced
the fundamental fault lines of the political game in
Beirut. Because of the Syrian military presence in
Lebanon for 3 decades, political identities in the country were driven by loyalty or opposition to Damascus. Therefore, it was natural that the Syrian civil war
would itself reemphasize these latent divides inside
Lebanon. At first, Prime Minister Najib Mikati tried
to “dissociate” the country from the Syrian predicament, which meant no foreign policy position taken
on the issue. More or less, this dissociation policy was
a deliberate attempt to prolong Lebanon’s state of denial. For several months, Mikati may have hoped that
it would help him balance between Hezbollah and the
movement of Saad Hariri.
But in spite of the government’s attempt, the country was not immune to the battle between pro-Syria
and anti-Syria camps. Starting in the spring of 2012,
the city of Tripoli in North Lebanon, the eastern region of the Bekaa, and South-Lebanon became the theaters of repeated clashes between the two camps with
the Lebanese Army proving unable to restore order.
In July 2012, Sheikh Assir, Salafist leader and imam
of the Bilal Bin Rabah Mosque in Sidon, decided to
launch a blockade of the city, the capital of the South
governorate of Lebanon, to demand the disarmament
of Hezbollah.
Then, in mid-August 2012, the arrest of former
minister of Information Michel Samaha, accused of
plotting a terrorist attack in Northern Lebanon and
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allegedly taking direct orders from Damascus, reminded the Lebanese of the long Syrian interference
in their internal affairs. It was followed in October by
a spectacular terrorist attack in the middle of Beirut
that targeted Wissam Al Hassan, head of police information, and closely involved in the prosecution of Samaha. In the following months, there were numerous
cases of intra-sect confrontations, which only grew as
Hezbollah’s support to Assad became obvious.
In the context of Lebanese politics, whether or not
Assad remains in power is no longer the central question. In any case, Hezbollah will have to make do with
a decreasingly reliable regional ally. A major issue for
the movement is to preserve what is left of Hezbollah’s long process of Lebanonization under Nasrallah’s leadership in the 1990s, a process which has been
weakened by the political crises of 2005, 2008, and
those occurring today. Thus, in other words, Hezbollah’s endurance after a collapse of the Assad regime
does not depend exclusively on its arsenal but on the
reactions of its constituency and the evolving balance
with its rivals in Beirut.
The anti-Syria camp of Saad Hariri has publicly
embraced the cause of Syrian rebels and aims at capitalizing on the crisis as a game changer vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Christian and Druze leaders have been in a
much more ambiguous situation. The Christian allies
of Hezbollah, the followers of General Michel Aoun,
are not at ease with Hezbollah’s full support of Assad.
But on the other side, the Christians associated with
Hariri eye with concern the steady rise of Sunni fundamentalism and jihadism with the fighters crossing
the border to Syria from the Tripoli area.
As proven by the history of Lebanon’s politics,
each of the political players is likely to change its cal-
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culus rapidly and rebalance the distribution of power
among the competing blocs, depending on the perceived outcome of the Syrian war. But eventually this
does not challenge Hezbollah’s power militarily. The
Salafis led by Sheikh Assir may be a nuisance in the
South, but they do not compete militarily with Hezbollah. Even the Lebanese Army does not constitute a
serious competitor to the military power of the Party.
It does not possess a comparable arsenal, but it is itself
a divided institution that reflects the sectarian rivalries
in the country. In other words, if Hezbollah’s efforts
were to result in loss, it would be due less to its military strength capabilities—again sufficient enough to
maintain the movement, even in the face of Israel or
any Lebanese rival—but on its political support, and
more particularly on its future ability to defuse the
impact of the Syrian crisis in the on-going Lebanese
Sunni-Shia rivalries to avoid the organization’s complete alienation from Beirut’s political scene.
For Israel, the paradox is that, although in the long
term, it would appreciate the fall of Hezbollah, in
the short term, it may prefer a strong Hezbollah that
maintains its hold on south Lebanon and its control
over its arsenal. This is the ultimate dimension of the
deterrence system shaped by both actors since 2006:
The more they rely on this calculus, the more they depend on the relative strength of the other to preserve
this strategic stability.
Another element of the equation that needs to
be considered is the uncertain future of the UNIFIL.
Since 2006, the expanded UNIFIL has been seen as
successfully preserving the peace in South Lebanon.
Compared to average peacekeeping operations, the
number of contributing nations (38), as well as the
overall number of troops (11,000), reflects the commit-
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ment of the international community. But today, the
elements that helped UNIFIL perform its mission are
turning against them. The first issue putting the future of UNIFIL at risk is the more visible assertiveness
of Hezbollah vis-à-vis the peacekeepers in the South.
Pragmatism prevailed, and there was an implicit division of labor, according to which UNIFIL forces were
able to monitor certain areas, while letting Hezbollah
maintain its hold in others.
This compromise worked until late-2011, but since
then, there have been numerous cases of interference
between the UN forces and the Party of God. For instance, officers referred to blocked patrols in areas
where they previously experienced no issue.90 The assertiveness of Hezbollah in the South is not new by
itself, but its scale is. This deterioration in the UNIFILHezbollah bargain may be Hezbollah’s way to remind
both UNIFIL and Israel that despite its engagement in
Syria, its forces remain focused on South Lebanon as
their key battleground.
In July 2013, the European Union (EU) officially
put the military wing of Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organizations. Some officials in France and Italy
feared that this recent European move to antagonize
Hezbollah’s role along the forces of Bashar al-Assad
against the rebels could exacerbate the difficulties
of UNIFIL. It started on Tuesday, May 21, when the
United Kingdom (UK) formally requested that the
EU add the military wing of Hezbollah to its list of
terrorist organizations. London had been pushing for
this change in the EU policy for several months, as
details of Hezbollah’s criminal activities surfaced in
Europe earlier this year.91 The major difference from
previous British attempts is that France and Germany,
two countries long considered to accommodate with
Hezbollah, support the initiative.
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One country expressed caution but in vain: Italy,
which is commanding UNIFIL. Rome was irritated by
the absence of any prior European coordination and
assessment concerning the potential repercussions of
the British initiative on European forces in Lebanon,
which represent nine of the contributing nations. Consequently, Hezbollah’s assertiveness in the South may
be an indirect way to deter the Europeans from targeting its involvement in Syria.
The second issue affecting the future of UNIFIL
is the level of cooperation with the Lebanese armed
forces. A key objective in 2006 was to “accompany
and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy
throughout the South.”92 But today it is estimated that
only 10 percent of UNIFIL patrols are conducted jointly with Lebanese troops.93 In fact, the clashes in the
northern part of the country, particularly in Tripoli,
between pro-Assad and anti-Assad forces have led to
a redeployment of the Lebanese soldiers from south
to north. The consequence for UNIFIL is that its mission is less about supporting the Lebanese State than
merely playing its role.
One could argue that the purpose of UNIFIL is still
relevant and that no regional player has any interest in
seeing them leave. Both Israel and Hezbollah want to
avoid a flare-up in the Lebanese theater. But one other
big issue that is less understood is the slow but steady
decline in UNIFIL size on the ground as a result of
its safety and its financial burden. Whereas UNIFIL
was supposed to comprise 15,000 men in 2006, it never
went above 13,500 and now numbers 11,000.
For the Europeans, the drawdown has already
started: European countries represented more than
60 percent of UNIFIL contingents in 2006, they now
constitute only 30 percent of the peacekeepers. These
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cuts in manpower result mainly from the European
financial crisis, but the rising problems of safety
for the peacekeepers also play a role. This was evidenced by Spain, a long-time key contributor that
substantially lowered its participation. France and
Italy also decreased their share of the burden and,
according to insiders in Rome and Paris, it could go
down even more. The result is that the more the Europeans leave the leadership of UNIFIL, the more
the high number of contributing nations becomes an
unmanageable liability.
For all these reasons, in the coming months, UNIFIL could reach a threshold below which its strategic credibility would be compromised. Particularly,
the political clout of UNIFIL without the Europeans would diminish. Since 2006, UNIFIL command
has only been assigned to France, Spain, and Italy.
Indonesia, now the biggest contributor to UNIFIL,
already made the claim to command the forces but
in vain, because there is a common understanding
among the UN Secretariat, Israel, and Lebanon that
the credibility of UNIFIL relies primarily on European
political and military commitment. The fact that Indonesia has no diplomatic relations with Israel also
means that an Indonesian commander would merely
have no influence.
The scholar might be tempted to argue that the
withdrawal of UNIFIL forces or their near-complete
irrelevance in the Israel-Hezbollah game would be the
ultimate way to measure the deterrence factor as the
prevailing one in the stability of the area. However,
the very risks of a new conflict may not be worth exploring such scenario in practice.
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Coping with Iranian Nuclear Opacity.
The third trigger for a shift in the Israel-Hezbollah
deterrence equation is the acquisition by the Iranian
regime of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as the several
rounds of talks between Western powers and Tehran failed to reach a diplomatic breakthrough, the
likelihood of a nuclear-armed Iran is still significant.
As of today, there is no undeniable evidence that
Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, but there are many
plausible signs that its program is not serving solely
civilian purposes.
Because a nuclear-armed Iran would challenge the
military escalation in the Middle East, it is worth exploring the ramifications of such scenario, in particular with regards to the Israel-Hezbollah competition.
The characteristics of an Iranian nuclear deterrent will
depend, first, on the advent of its nuclear program
in the military domain, whether Iran manufactures
deliverable or only unassembled nuclear weapons;
second, on the quantity and quality of its delivery systems; and third, on the inclusion of nuclear weapons
in Iran’s strategic culture. Several scholars interpret
the modern Iranian international posture as the expression of Persian history and identity that combines
a sense of superiority over its neighbors with a deep
sense of insecurity.94 As a result, academic studies
have usually evoked Iranian strategic culture to argue
that Iran is a rational actor rather than an irrational
and unpredictable religiously fanatic state.95
One critical unknown in such scenario is the role
that Iran would confer to nuclear weapons in both
its competition with Israel and its patronage of Hezbollah. The Iranian decision may test the status quo
between the IDF and Hezbollah, providing the latter
with a new precious psychological advantage.
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Still, the question of Iran’s security guarantees
to its allies or proxies is not obvious and cannot be
answered only by discussing the relevance of formal
guarantees. A fair share of experts on the topic asserts
that a nuclear-armed Iran would not change the Israel-Hezbollah equation because the Iranian leadership
would by no means risk their country to support the
Lebanese movement. Shashank Joshi from the Royal
United Service Institute (RUSI) writes that:
[This scenario] would be as if Slobodan Milosevic had
threatened NATO [The North Atlantic Treaty Organization] with Russian nuclear attack during the Kosovo
War of 1999. Only if Iran made a concerted effort to
extend deterrence over Hezbollah would such a declaration carry weight, but this means returning to the
question of why Iran would take risks so disproportionate to its interests.96

But the relation between Iran and Hezbollah cannot strictly be analyzed through analogies taken from
alliances between states. First, at the military level,
many Israeli scholars and military planners tend to
see Hezbollah as closely linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in a way that transcends a mere
proxy-patron relation. Accordingly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards would be involved at all levels of
Hezbollah’s military structure. This obviously questions the level of autonomy of the Lebanese organization vis-à-vis the Iranian regime in terms of decisionmaking. For instance, in January 2005, Major General
Jafari ambiguously claimed that “in addition to its
own capabilities, Iran has also excellent deterrence capabilities outside its [own borders] and if necessary it
will utilize them.”97 Although it has been argued that
Hezbollah was primarily a Lebanese organization, the
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fact that the first vision prevails in the Israeli defense
community has implications on the way the escalation
process would be understood by the IDF.98
Second, at the political level, it is often forgotten
that Iran’s and Hezbollah’s leaders share a feeling of
common destiny that goes beyond state-to-nonstate
interactions. Ties between Hassan Nasrallah or the late
Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (the spiritual guide of
Hezbollah) and the religious and political leaders in
Tehran date back to the 1960s and 1970s when they
were all students at the Shia School of Najaf in Iraq.99
These ties are not only spiritual, they are political but
yet refer to a kinship that is not state-centered. They
refer to the old concept of Ibn Khaldoun of ‘asabiyya
that designates solidarity in a social group based on
the sense of shared purpose and esprit de corps.100
These elements mean that Hezbollah would benefit, at least symbolically, from the uncertainty associated to Iran’s involvement in the crisis. It could exploit
this opacity in various ways. As a nonstate actor, it
could play the game of calculated irrationality. In his
seminal book, On Escalation, Herman Kahn detailed
the logic of such behavior:
In most deterrent situations, once deterrence has
failed it is irrational to carry out the previously made
warnings or threats of retaliation since that action
will produce an absolute or net loss to the retaliator.
Thus the threat of retaliation, in order to be believable,
must depend upon the potential irrationality of the
retaliator.101

As a result, in the midst of a conflict, an emotional,
out-of-control threat of an overwhelming but unspecified retaliation issued by Hassan Nasrallah could convey the intended impression of irrationality that would
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deter the IDF.102 Hezbollah could also show great confidence during the confrontation if it assumed (rightly
or wrongly) that Iran would undoubtedly back it up in
the event of escalation. However, even if the IDF had
evidence that Iran was supporting Hezbollah’s adventurism, they would have to maintain a disconnection
between the two fronts. To that aim, they might have
to refrain from directly attacking Iranian targets and
limit the scope of their retaliation to Hezbollah targets
in order to avoid uncontrolled escalation. Unless Tehran offered a formal pledge regarding nuclear protection of its proxies (which is unlikely), Israel would
have to operate in an uncertain environment where
the fault lines for escalation would be unknown and,
as a result, extremely difficult to control. In a nutshell,
nuclear opacity works here as a miscalculation multiplier. Israel may attempt to disconnect the Hezbollah
challenge from the Iranian front the same way it is doing with the Syrian front. However, the major difference is that whereas Hezbollah has an objective interest in disconnecting the Lebanese and Syrian fronts, it
also benefits from assimilating its fight with Israel to
the Iranian nuclear ambitions. It raises the costs, either
military or at least psychological, of an IDF intervention against the Party of God.
All in all, the deterrence game that prevailed until recently between Israel and Hezbollah is likely to
be put under serious tests in the coming years. The
volatility of the regional environment is reflected in
the developments in Lebanon, Iran, and Syria. But
when push comes to shove, the question remains the
same: In the name of which logic could Hezbollah or
Israel decide to end the cold peace that lasted since
2006? This relates to a deeper unknown: How long can
the rationalities of both Israel and Hezbollah match
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each other in order to prevent a new conflict? As we
have seen in this monograph, both have different approaches to deterrence, making the relative stability of
the region for the last 8 years even more bewildering.
CONCLUSION
The findings of this monograph have implications
for both scholars and practitioners. First, the history
of Israel-Hezbollah competition since the 2006 war is
a revealing case on the making of a deterrence system
between two adversaries. It highlights the role of arms
race—both offensive and defensive means—to create
a kind of “balance of terror,” as well as the importance of public messages and declaratory policies—as
seen through the Israeli Dahya concept or Hezbollah’s
propaganda.
In the meantime, this case also stresses the precariousness of any deterrence system. The stand-off
between Israel and Hezbollah reached this level only
through specific measures and conditions that can be
reversed in the future. In particular, exogenous factors
such as the unraveling of the Syrian civil war or the
developments of the Iranian nuclear issue can jeopardize the equilibrium. Moreover, the study of Lebanese
politics emphasizes the uncertainties related to the
logic of deterrence with a non-state actor like Hezbollah. This is why this analysis aimed at offering a cautious look at deterrence theories in the Middle East by
reminding that such situations are neither naturally
engendered nor eternally established.
This also matters for the practitioners in the U.S.
national security community. This monograph ventured in particular to explain the potential ramifications of the crisis in Syria and the Iranian conundrum
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over the Israel-Hezbollah struggle. We have seen, for
instance, that Israeli air strikes in Syria in the spring of
2013 did not intend to escalate the conflict, but rather
to disconnect it from the Lebanese theater. Likewise,
the current and future role of missiles and rockets
in Hezbollah’s strategic culture gives an important
meaning to American-Israeli cooperation in the field
of missile defense system.
The understanding of all the implicit rules of the
game in this deterrence system may prove crucial for
U.S. decisionmakers when addressing the on-going
events. If a conflict was to occur again in the Levant,
and given the readiness of both parties, it is likely to
be wider in its scale than the 2006 war. This is the very
reason why the U.S. Government needs to be fully
aware of the inner logic of this conflict, in order if
necessary to rapidly identify the ways to deescalate
the latter.
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